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PREEMPTIVE STRIKES ON STATE AUTONOMY:
THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
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Exactly two hundred years ago this week, on February 21,
1787, the Continental Congress adopted a resolution calling for a
Convention to revise the Articles of Confederation.

The work of

the Convention was completed at Philadelphia seven months later,
on September 17, 1787.

On that day, the Framers signed the

enduring document we celebrate and re-examine during this
Bicentennial Year.

It was no easy task to convince the citizens

of the several states, during the ratification process, that the
new Constitution did not pose a threat to their newly-won
independence.

Fearing that a powerful central government merely

would replicate the arbitrary ways of the British Crown, many saw
greater detriment than benefit in the formation of a "more
perfect Union."l
One of the provisions of the proposed Constitution that
caused the citizenry some concern was the portion of Article VI
that has come to be known as the Supremacy Clause:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thinq in the Constitution or Law of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.2
Writing as Publius in No. 33 of the Federalist Papers,
Alexander Hamilton sought to dispel the People's fears that the
Supremacy Clause would lead to an erosion of their rights as
citizens of the several states.

Hamilton wrote that a larger

political society composed of a number of smaller ·political
societies would amount to nothing if its laws were not supreme;

he pointed out, however, that the larger society should be
treated as a usurper when it acts in excess of its constitutional
powers and invades the residuary authority of the smaller
societies.3

According to Hamilton, only those laws based on "the

enumerated and legitimate objects" of federal jurisdiction would
be accorded the dignity of "SUPREME LAW of the land."4
Obviously, Hamilton's assurances were based on his concept
that the national government was to be one of limited powers,
that all other governmental authority remained in the states, and
that any incursion into the residual authority of the states
would be considered an illegal encroachment.

James Madison used

these words to describe his view of the division of
responsibility:

"The powers delegated by the proposed

Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous
and indefinite."S

The Federalists clearly were confident that

the enumerated powers, specific and defined, would serve as a
significant limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
What they did not foresee, of course, was the expansive
interpretation of the enumerated powers that would be provided by
the third branch of government.
It was in fact the Anti-Federalists who anticipated that the
Judiciary would be called upon to referee the frequent disputes
that inevitably would arise under the Supremacy Clause.

The

Anti-Federalists predicted that the federal courts, by reason of
their authority to decide when state law is preempted by federal

law under the Supremacy Clause, would be the instruments by which
state power would be reduced to naught.

An article in the Essays

of Brutus series published on February 14, 1788, urging rejection
of the proposed Constitution, anticipated that ratification would
spawn the following developments:

adoption of federal laws

duplicative of state laws in areas where state and federal
jurisdiction is concurrent; extension of central government
operations into those areas; and federal court condonation of
these enlarged activities by liberal construction of the powers
of the central government.

As a result, according to Brutus, the

rights of the states to act would be diminished to the point of
"becoming so trifling and unimportant as not to be worth
having."6

It is generally thought that Brutus was Robert Yates,

a New York judge who was a delegate to the Constitutional
Convention.7

Yates left the convention before the Constitution

was completed and later wrote to Governor Clinton that he opposed
"the consolidation of the United States into one government."8
Although the dire predictions of the Anti-Federalists have
not entirely come to pass, some of the problems they foresaw two
hundred years ago are with us today.

Certainly, the Supreme

Court has approved the exercise of broad-ranging federal
authority, despite the limited powers envisioned by the Framers.
This, of course, has allowed the central.government to act in
many areas originally thought to be primarily of state concern.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court increasingly has been called upon,
in cases where state and federal legislation affect the same
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subject matter, to decide whether the state activity has been
preempted under the Supremacy Clause.

I propose in this Lecture

to reveal the confusion and inconsistency of the Courts when
faced with issues of statutory preemption.

I also propose to

show the consequent need for Congress to play a more active role
in defining the scope of permissible state activity and in
preserving the constitutional framework of federalism.

It seems

to me that the obligation of Congress to assure the states a
proper range of governmental operations is implicated in the duty
of the legislative branch recently described by the Attorney
General -- the duty to interpret the Constitution in the course
of performing its official functions.9

Actually, the Attorney

General said that this interpretive function is vested in all
three branches, and I certainly do not mean to say that the
executive and judicial branches have no part to play in the
preservation of our federal system.

My contention is that

Congress, by being alert to preemption problems, can play a
vitally important role in the protection of state autonomy.
Indeed, as the branch of government closest to the People,
Congress has a positive duty in this regard.

I shall have some

suggestions and recommendations on how that duty can best be
fulfilled at the conclusion of this discussion.
The Supremacy Clause was tested
out of the War of 1812.

ear~y

on in a case arising

The State of Pennsylvania had enacted a

statute providing for a state court-martial of members of the
militia who failed to obey a call to service by the President of
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the United States.

The penalties provided were those prescribed

by federal law for the same offense.

In upholding the

jurisdiction of the state court-martial, Justice Bushrod
Washington, writing for the Supreme Court majority, found it
sufficient that the concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by the
state and federal governments was authorized by the laws of the
state and not prohibited by the laws of the United States.lO
Although he found no repugnance between the two statutes in the
case before him, he speculated that the will of congress could be
"thwarted and opposed" even if it were possible to comply with
state law without violating the requirements of a federal
statute.ll

Justice Story, in dissent, declared the narrower rule

that in cases of concurrent authority, state laws would yield to
federal laws on the same subject only in cases of "direct and
manifest collision" and then only to the extent that they were
incompatible.l2

Curiously, Story found the Pennsylvania Militia

Act wholly incompatible with federal statutes relating to the
same subject.
When Aaron Ogden sued Thomas Gibbons to enjoin the operation
of steamboat service between Elizabethtown, New Jersey and New
York City, he relied upon his ownership by assignment of the
exclusive rights of navigation originally granted to Robert R.
Livingston and Robert Fulton by the New York legislature.
In defense, Gibbons contended that his ships were duly enrolled
and licensed for the coastal trade under an Act of Congress
adopted in 1793, and that his rights to navigate the waters in
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question overrode the exclusive franchise granted by the state
legislature.

The Supreme Court agreed with Gibbons and reversed

a judgment by New York's highest court in favor of Ogden.

In an

opinion written by John Marshall in 1824 echoing the Story
dissent in the militia case, the Court held that its inquiry was
limited to the question of "whether the laws of New York, as
expounded by the highest tribunal of that state, have, in their
application to this case, come into collision with an Act of
Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act
entitles him."l3

Having found such a collision, the Court

perceived no difficulty in concluding that the Act of Congress
was supreme and that "the law of the state, though enacted in the
exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it."l4

In the

opinion, the Great Chief Justice wrote that "the framers of our
constitution foresaw this state of things, and provided for it,
by declaring the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws
made in pursuance of it."l5
There you have it -- a succinct statement of the doctrine of
preemption as dictated by the Supremacy Clause.
necessary to invoke the doctrine were made clear:

The elements
a state law

enacted in the exercise of the sovereign powers reserved to the
states; a federal law enacted by Congress within the enumerated
legislative authority granted by the Constitution; and an actual,
not theoretical, collision between the two.

Simply put, state

and federal statutes, though both be otherwise valid, cannot

6

occupy the same space at the same time and the state provision
must yield.
Despite the elegance and lucidity of the Gibbons opinion and
the clear rule it established, some actual collision cases
continue to be litigated and to find their way to the Supreme
Court.

In 1962, the Court was presented with a clear collision

between a state community property rule and federal provisions
governing joint ownership of U.S. Savings Bonds.l6
provisions of course prevailed.

The federal

And in 1977, one hundred

fifty-three years after Gibbons, in a case involving issues
virtually identical to those confronted in Gibbons, federal
licenses covering mackerel fishery were held to prevail over
Virginia statutes limiting the fishing rights of non-residents.l7
These later cases may be more of a tribute to the fact that
nothing can forestall litigation or impair the tenacity of
lawyers in our nation than to the enigmatic nature of the
precedent.
Unhappily, preemption jurisprudence no longer is confined to
questions of actual collision.

The wide-ranging inquiry proposed

by Justice Washington now has become the standard.

In the name

of the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court now examines state law
to determine whether it is somehow inconsistent with the purposes
of federal law or is incompatible with a. federal regulatory
scheme or interferes in some way with federal policy.

In a case

holding that the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act of 1939 was
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preempted by the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940, the
Court described the expanded scope of its inquiry as follows:
This Court, in considering the validity of state
laws in the light of . . . federal laws touching the
same subject, has made use of the following
expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the
field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability;
inconsistency; violationt curtailment and interference.
But none of these expressions provides an infallible
constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional
yardstick.
In the final analysis, there can be no one
crystal clear distinctly marked formula.l8
The lack of a clear yardstick or formula has fostered the
development of preemption jurisprudence on a case by case,
statute by statute basis, devoid of analytic consistency and
lacking in doctrinal intelligibility.

It is difficult to

disagree with the commentators who have written that the Supreme
court's preemption decisions "have often produced considerable
confusion and criticism"l9 and that "[p]erhaps the most
troublesome aspect of the doctrine of federal preemption has been
its historically inconsistent application."20
The confusion and inconsistency are especially troublesome
in light of the fact that preemption litigation has involved so
many diverse areas of law and therefore has resulted in the
displacement of numerous state regulations clearly adopted in the
pursuit of legitimate state objectives.

In the Alien

Registration case I referred to earlier, the Court held that a
state statute requiring aliens to register and to carry a card to
exhibit to police on demand was preempted by a federal statute
requiring registration but not the carrying of a card.
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While

there obviously was no collision in the Gibbons v. Ogden sense,
or even an actual conflict between the two statutes, the Court
held that Congress had occupied the field of alien registration,
adverting to the supremacy of national power in the general area
of foreign affairs, including power over immigration and
naturalization.21

The Court saw the state law as an obstacle

blocking the achievement of congressional goals, although it is
difficult to see how this was so.

At any rate, there was no

question that the state statute represented a proper exercise of
the state's police power.
The occupation of the field test, as applied in the Alien
Registration case and in other cases, has been criticized for
leaving open a number of questions:

What standards should be

applied in determining whether Congress has in fact occupied a
field?

Are there good reasons for finding exclusive federal

occupancy?

What are the boundaries of the specific field under

examination?22

It seems to me that in applying the occupation of

the field test and some of the other tests it developed to decide
preemption issues, the Supreme Court has involved itself
unnecessarily with policy problems whose solution is best left to
the other branches.

Whether it is preferable that there be

national uniformity in one area or another is not for a court to
determine.
It seems quite unexceptional to say that when it is not
physically impossible for one engaged in interstate commerce to
comply with both state and federal regulations, the state
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regulation is not preempted.

This, in fact, was the principle

underlying the decision upholding different maturity standards
established by the state of California and the federal government
to keep prematurely harvested avocados from the market.

The

Court found that there was no preemption because there was "no
inevitable collision between the two schemes of regulation,
despite the dissimilarity of the standards."23

The fact that the

two schemes had the same objectives was not held to be
controlling.
Yet a California labelling statute, imposing requirements
more stringent than those imposed by federal law with respect to
weight variations due to moisture loss in flour, was found to be
preempted.24

The rationale there was that the purposes and

objectives of Congress could not be accomplished and executed
unless packages bearing the same indicated weight contained the
same quantity of the product.

The purpose of the federal

statute, according to Justice Thurgood Marshall, who authored the
opinion, was to facilitate value comparisons by consumers
throughout the country.

It is difficult to discern just how

there would be a problem with value comparisons when the state
regulation was more strict than the federal.

It is especially

difficult to reconcile this case with the avocado case, since
compliance with both flour labelling schemes was not a "physical
impossibility."

Despite the dissimilarity of standards, there

was no inevitable collision between them because flour
manufacturers, knowing where their product is to be shipped,
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could pack and label to comply with state law as well as federal.
The physical impossibility test, certainly, has not been
consistent in its application.
According to another test developed by the Supreme Court,
state regulation is preempted where Congress has legislated so
comprehensively that no room remains for the states to supplement
federal law.

This rule controlled the disposition of a case

known as Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,25 and later Supreme
Court cases have cited Rice as authority for the rule.

A close

examination of Rice, however, reveals that there was perhaps some
room the Court overlooked and that the displacement of state
regulation there was another instance of policy choice.

The case

involved the regulation of grain warehouses under the Federal
Warehouse Act and under certain provisions of Illinois law
governing grain storage and storage charges.

Although the

federal regulatory scheme was a generalized one, revolving around
the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to issue and
suspend warehouse licenses, and the state scheme was a
particularized one, establishing specific warehouse standards and
providing for rate regulation, the federal scheme was held to
displace the state's entirely.

The Court found that the federal

Act had been amended specifically to remedy past problems arising
from a system of dual regulation.

Having so found, the Court

ignored the areas apparently open to state regulation and leaped
to the conclusion that "the federal scheme prevails though it is
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a more modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than that of the
State."26
Justice Frankfurter, in a compelling dissent, disagreed, with
the proposition that Congress could, by merely touching a subject
matter, render it untouchable by a state "though there is neither
paper nor operating conflict between federal and State spheres of
authority."27

Accordingly, he rejected the Court's conclusion

that the federal Act inferentially deprived Illinois of a
rate-fixing authority exercised over a period of seventy years
while not conferring such authority on any federal agency.
Frankfurter declared that the authority of states under the
reserved powers always should survive "unless Congress has
clearly swept the Boards of all State authority, or the State's
claim is in unmistakable conflict with what Congress has
ordered."28

It seems that the "no room available" test is open

to interpretation as well.
The Supreme Court has taught us that "[t]he critical
question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether Congress
intended that federal regulation supersede state law."29

The

confusing and inconsistent rules and tests I have been discussing
all were designed to divine congressional intent, express or
implied.

The word "divine" seems appropriate here, because its

dictionary definitions include:

to guess.; to know by

inspiration, intuition or reflection; and to locate water with a
divining rod.30

All these synonyms are applicable to the manner

in which the Court attempts to ascertain congressional intent to
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preempt.

An expression of intent in explicit statutory language,

however, should be conclusive.

Unfortunately, it is not.

An express provision for the maintenance of state jurisdiction
was defeated in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,31 a celebrated case in
preemption jurisprudence.

In that case a state's Sedition Act

was held to be displaced by the federal Smith Act, which
prohibited the overthrow of the United States government by force
or violence.

That determination was made in the face of a

specific savings clause prohibiting the impairment of the
criminal jurisdiction established under the laws of the several
states.32

It is also noteworthy that Congressman Howard Smith,

sponsor of the Smith Act, wrote a vehement denial "that Congress
ever had the faintest notion of nullifying the concurrent
jurisdiction of the respective sovereign states."33

The

preemption determination in Nelson was bottomed on the conclusion
that the Smith Act was intended to "occupy the field of
sedition."34
Having previously written of my apprehensions regarding the
nationalization of criminal law,35 I pause here to note that, in
addition to the general savings provision ignored in Nelson,
several statutes defining federal crimes include their own
provisions saving state jurisdiction.36

One commentator,

expressing a concern for double prosecution and punishment,
suggests that unless the Supreme Court decision holding double
jeopardy inapplicable in the case of state and federal
prosecutions for the same conduct37 is re-examined, or
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legislation is adopted to provide that a state or federal trial
bars prosecution in the other jurisdiction, "a finding of
congressional intent to pre-empt is the only way to protect the
defendant from the rigors of double prosecution."38

I do not

know how such a finding is possible when there is an express
savings clause, although the Supreme Court certainly overcame
that problem in Nelson.

My own view is that the federal

government generally should get out of the business of defining
and prosecuting crimes primarily of state and local concern.
Federal criminal prosecution should be limited to misconduct
affecting clearly defined national interests.
Just as there are explicit savings clauses in federal
legislation expressing the intent of Congress to preserve state
jurisdiction, so are there explicit supersedure clauses
expressing the intent to preempt state jurisdiction.

I have

given an example of how the former has been ignored, and I now
present an example of the disregard of the latter.

The Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 includes a provision that
the Act "shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employment benefit plan"39
described in the Act.

There was no dispute that "employee

benefit plan" included any plan, fund or program established to
provide vacation benefits.

The plaintiffs in a case known as

California Hospital Association v. Henning40 sought a declaration
that the clear preemption provision superseded a California state
policy barring forfeiture of vacation benefits and requiring
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payment of a pro rata share of such benefits upon termination of
employment.

The plaintiffs maintained benefit plans in

contravention of the California policy.

In denying preemption,

the Ninth Circuit court of Appeals interpreted the Act to apply
only to funded vacation plans and not to traditional payroll
payments of vacation wages from general funds.

The decision has

been criticized, of course, on the ground that it was for
Congress, not the courts, to restrict the coverage provided by
the Act.41
Clear expressions of intent found in the legislative history
also have been ignored by the courts.

In Burbank v. Lockheed Air

Terminal,42 the Court found that a city ordinance prohibiting the
take-off of pure jet aircraft during certain hours was preempted
by federal statutes regulating aircraft noise.

The Court relied

upon what it referred to as the "pervasive nature" of the
regulatory scheme.43

The dissenting opinion, however, referred

to specific legislative history demonstrating congressional
intent to restrict the applicability of the federal legislation
to overflying aircraft and to permit local control of the type
established by the City of Burbank.44

The legislative history

argument in the dissent was bolstered by the required assumption
that the historic police powers of the states are not to be
superseded by a federal Act, unless such 'displacement is the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.45

It never has been

contended that noise control is not encompassed within the
traditional police powers.
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Legislative history also was ignored in the determination of
an action brought by franchisees of 7-Eleven convenience stores
against their franchisor for violation of the California
Franchise Investment Act.

The action was commenced in the

California Superior Court, and the franchisor sought arbitration
of the controversies under the terms of an arbitration clause in
the franchise agreements.

The Supreme Court ultimately made a

determination of preemption, holding that the Federal Arbitration
Act established a national policy favoring arbitration and
deprived the states of the authority to provide a judicial forum
when the parties had agreed to arbitrate their differences.46
The dissenting opinion, however, provided persuasive historical
evidence that the Federal Arbitration Act was intended to be
enforced only in the federal courts.47

The majority found such a

direct and irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law
that the Supremacy Clause was needed to resolve it.

The dissent,

relying on legislative history, found the federal law wholly
inapplicable.

That's what I call a difference of opinion!

Courts have employed many strange modes of analysis, as we
have seen, in pursuit of the elusive congressional intent.

I

think that the outer limits of preemption analysis were reached
last December, when a court found that the absence of federal
gasoline regulation manifested the intention of Congress to leave
the field unregulated.

The court was the Temporary Emergency

Court of Appeals, which is charged with the enforcement of the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973.
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When Congress

decided to deregulate gasoline prices and to permit free market
forces to control, Puerto Rico reinstated its own price
regulations.

Several oil companies challenged these regulations

and prevailed.48

The Court of Appeals drew its rationale for a

finding of implied intent to preempt from a Supreme Court case in
which the following statement was made:

"[A] federal decision to

forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative
federal determination that the area is best left unregulated, and
in that event would have as much preemptive force as a decision
to regulate."49

The logical dissenter in the Puerto Rico case

found it "paradoxical" that the expiration of temporary emergency
federal measures should have the effect of permanently
constraining the exercise of the police powers of state
governments.50

Preemption jurisprudence indeed has entered the

twilight zone!
As the shadow of federal regulation has lengthened,
supremacy problems have found their way into such diverse legal
fields as torts,51 civil procedure,52 antitrust,53 patents,54 and
environmental law.55

Supremacy questions have affected cases

involving the regulation of public utilities, transportation,
labor, navigation, securities and banking.56

Preemption issues

are on the calendar at every Supreme Court Term.

During the

1985-1986 Term, the Court found that a Florida tax on aviation
fuel was not preempted by the Federal Aviation Act,57 that North
Carolina could impose an ad valorem tax on tobacco without
contravening the federal statutory scheme governing
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customs-bonded warehouses,58 that Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission power rates prevailed in a collision with rates fixed
by the North Carolina Utilities Commission,59 and that states may
establish telephone plant and equipment depreciation rules
applicable to intrastate telephone service even though those
rules conflict with federal rules applicable to interstate
service.60

The 1986-1987 Term already has brought us an

important decision holding that a California law requiring
pregnancy leave and subsequent reinstatement to employment is not
preempted by the Federal Pregnancy Act, which only forbids
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.61
It cannot be denied that the Supreme Court has taken on a
major share of the burden of adjusting and monitoring
federal-state relations by an ad hoc process of decision making
in preemption cases.

In my opinion, the results have been mixed

and state interests often have suffered in the process.

There

are those who are all too willing to leave the question of
societal needs for federal intervention to the federal courts as
a function of preemption jurisprudence".62

This is judicial

policy-making at its worst, and I regard the concept as
dangerous, undemocratic and violative of basic constitutional
principles.

Those who contend that the courts have a duty to

apply the preemption doctrine to promote cooperation between
state and federal governments63 mistake the judicial function as
fully as those who look to the doctrine as a vehicle for
reconciling competing state and federal interests.64

1A

The

judicial role in applying the Supremacy Clause should be a
limited one -- to declare federal legislation adopted under the
powers granted to Congress by the Constitution supreme over any
state law in actual collision with it.

I suggest that a clear

definition by Congress of the areas of regulation remaining to
the states will in large part eliminate the confusion,
inconsistency and burdensome caseloads that have been the
hallmarks of preemption jurisprudence.

I recommend the

following:
1.

There should be established in each chamber of Congress

a Standing Committee on State-Federal Relations.

The excellent

report entitled "The Status of Federalism in America" by the
Working Group on Federalism of the Domestic Policy Council65
suggests the establishment of federalism subcommittees of the
judiciary committees in each House to review all proposed
legislation with potentially adverse implications for state
sovereignty.

I believe that the dignity of federalism issues

requires the appointment of a Standing Committee to be charged,
among other things, with the duty of reviewing all legislation
that might in any way touch upon areas of state concern.
Included would be the responsibility for coordinating state and
federal legislation and for maintaining an awareness of the
constitutional limitations of congressional power.
2.

The Standing Committee would be required to solicit the

views of the states, those representing state interests and other
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concerned citizens.

In the course of reviewing each piece of

legislation involving areas of state concern and preemption
possibilities, the spotlight of public opinion would be focused
on the effect of the exercise of congressional power.

Input from

diverse sectors would assure full consideration by the Committees
of the matters under review.

Although this process may be

criticized for being slow and cumbersome, it will serve to deter
hastily drawn and ill-conceived legislation affecting state
interests.

It may also reveal that existing state regulation

is adequate and that entry of Congress into the field is
unnecessary.
3.

A detailed Report of the findings and recommendations of

the Committees would be filed for each piece of legislation
reviewed.

The Domestic Policy Council calls for a "federalism

assessment," but I think that the Committees can go much further.
Their Reports should include the results of their research into
existing and contemplated state legislation in the area under
review and a compendium of the views expressed to the Committees
through hearings and communications.

Included in each Report

would be specific language to be included in the legislation
relative to the following matters:

a statement of the outer

limits of federal regulation in the area or field subject of the
legislation; a clear delineation of that which remains subject to
state regulation; and, if applicable, a description of specific
types of existing state legislation to be displaced.

The general

savings clauses and the general supersedure clauses, as I have

?0

demonstrated, do not always work, and these suggestions will go a
long way toward eliminating preemption problems.
4.

The Committee should undertake a review of all past

Supreme Court decisions applying the Supremacy Clause.

Such a

review will enable Congress to determine whether it disagrees
with any previous preemption decision, and is not a difficult
project in these days of computerized legal research.

The

process should follow that recommended for a study of new
legislation.

It is an advantage of the Supremacy Clause that

Congress can overrule a Supreme Court decision on preemption by
amending or repealing the federal legislation.
course, have no such authority.

The states, of

In my own view, many of the

decisions displacing state regulation were wrongly decided and
have led to the extension of federal law into areas better
regulated by the states.

(Perhaps many of these areas are best

left unregulated entirely.)

Congress can do much to rectify the

errors of the past.
5.

Legislation should be enacted to deprive federal

agencies of their ability to preempt state authority by
regulation.

The Supreme Court has held that a federal agency

acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated
authority may preempt state regulation.66

Aside from the

constitutional questions posed by preemption by administrative
regulation, sound policy dictates that so-called independent
federal agencies, having diverse interests and agendas, should
not be allowed to displace state law.
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I cannot agree that

administrative agencies have any role in balancing state and
federal interests.67

Congress must reclaim its exclusive

prerogative of deciding when state law is to be preempted.

If my suggestions are adopted and greater responsibility for
the preservation of federalism is shifted to Congress, I am
confident that the states will once again be permitted to operate
without interference in the areas in which they are most
competent.68

I sincerely believe that Congress can assist in

restoring the balance envisioned by the Founding Fathers when
they created our federal system of government.

By reducing the

role of the courts in preemption litigation, Congress certainly
can help to overcome preemptive strikes on state autonomy.

It

could thereby enable us to return to the Supremacy Clause
interpretations of John Marshall.
good Judge.

He was, after all, a pretty

But then, all he really had to go on was the written

text of the United States Constitution.
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